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THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
AND THE RIGHTS OF THE PARENT:
DAMRON V. DAMRON AND THE FUTURE OF PARENTING
AND CHILD CUSTODY IN NORTH DAKOTA
In itself, homosexuality is as limiting as heterosexuality:
the ideal should be to be capable of loving a woman or a man; either, a
human being, without feeling fear, restraint, or obligation.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Simone de Beauvoir’s sentiments speak volumes about American
culture; society is often preoccupied with comparing heterosexuality to
homosexuality in many aspects of life.2 This notion is especially true in the
family sphere with regard to how courts view homosexual and same-sex
couple parenting.3 For many years, the topic of homosexual parents’ rights
in child custody has been heavily debated.4 Discussions typically involve
issues relating to moral character, nurturing style, and personal religious
belief.5 While courts have traditionally considered the parenting skills of
homosexual individuals and the appropriateness of their child rearing
environments to be potentially hazardous to children for various reasons,
gay and lesbian parents have recently pressured courts to stray from these
conclusions.6
For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court recently held in
Damron v. Damron 7 that the averment that a custodial parent is homosexual
is not a per se reason to modify child custody.8 The environment in which
1. Simone de Beauvoir—quotation, http://www.quotegarden.com/homosexuality.html.
2. See Eileen P. Huff, The Children of Homosexual Parents: The Voices the Courts Have Yet
to Hear, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 695, 696 (2001) (providing that a homosexual
parent provides a living environment as suitable for children as a heterosexual parent, and that
“courts should not find a distinction between homosexual and heterosexual parenting”).
3. See id. (explaining that in following early custody modification rulings, courts believed
that homosexuality alone was grounds for modification).
4. Id.
5. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 833, 833 (1997) (arguing that homosexual or same-sex parenting will not result in the
same positive upbringing of children as heterosexual parenting, and explaining why society
generally reaches this conclusion).
6. Bruce D. Gill, Best Interest of the Child? A Critique of Judicially Sanctioned Arguments
Denying Child Custody to Gays and Lesbians, 68 TENN. L. REV. 361, 362 (2001) (arguing that
gay and lesbian parents may provide an environment equal to that of heterosexual parents).
7. 2003 ND 166, 670 N.W.2d 871.
8. Damron, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d at 875.
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the child lives, as well as the best interests of the child, are the most
important issues surrounding custody.9 Homosexual parents have been
encouraging courts, such as the North Dakota Supreme Court, to recognize
the injustice of holding homosexual and heterosexual parents to a different
standard with regard to child custody matters.10 The North Dakota
Supreme Court’s ruling in Damron could prompt other jurisdictions to
ignore the topic of homosexuality altogether, or to ask for more evidence
than a parent’s sexual orientation when considering whether a child’s best
interests will be served.11 This more stringent approach would press those
jurisdictions to truly address the best interests of the child, thereby
preventing courts from considering how homosexuality will endanger a
child.12 Courts would therefore also justly afford more parents the
constitutionally recognized right to have and raise a family.13
This note begins with a brief history of how courts have dealt with
lesbian and gay parenting issues, followed by an overview of the legal
standards applied in various jurisdictions to afford, or take away, rights
from both children and homosexual parents.14 Most importantly, Part II
focuses on Damron, which is the most recent North Dakota case to reach
the conclusion that evidence of homosexuality is not a per se justification to
modify child custody.15 Next, Part III discusses the evidence needed, as
provided by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron, to modify a child
custody ruling favoring a gay or lesbian parent in North Dakota.16 This
section also discusses the rights of parents and the best interests of the
child, facets upon which judiciaries focus in child custody determinations.17
Part III further addresses the implications that Damron may have on future
9. Id. ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873.
10. Gill, supra note 6, at 362.
11. See generally Brief of Appellant at 4, Damron v. Damron, 2003 WL 23695772 (No.
20030135) (N.D. (2003)) (arguing that modification of child custody due to a parent’s sexual
orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause, and that many jurisdictions have held that a
parent’s homosexuality cannot be considered in modification of custody unless the child is directly harmed); Gill, supra note 6, at 362 (arguing that a court may deny custody to a homosexual
parent as a “pretext for the court’s own bias or political agenda regarding homosexuality”).
12. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 695 (stating that although courts generally look at the
best interests of the child when determining custody and modification, homosexuality is frequently addressed and the courts incorrectly focus on this aspect of the case).
13. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the right to bear and raise
children is a fundamental right).
14. See discussion infra Part II (examining United States Supreme Court decisions, legal
standards, and notions of the morality of homosexuality).
15. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875.
16. See discussion infra Part III (explaining the Damron decision and the amount of evidence
needed to modify a preliminary custody ruling based on homosexuality).
17. See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining the best interests of the child standard and the
rights of the parent).
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North Dakota child custody issues.18 Then, Part IV acknowledges the prospect of the disappearance of the stigmatization of homosexual parents, as
well as a review of the negative and plausibly unfounded conclusions that
North Dakota courts and judiciaries nationwide have reached when
confronted with homosexual parenting issues.19 Finally, this note concludes
with a suggestion for a more effective legal standard to determine child
custody when homosexual parents or same-sex couples are involved, which
would ensure that both children’s and parents’ rights are justly
recognized.20
Until recently, courts placed great emphasis on homosexuality to prevent gay or lesbian parents from obtaining or maintaining custody of their
children.21 The reasons for denying custody to gay and lesbian parents arise
from the proverbial “tradition” of denying rights to gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgendered individuals, occurring at both federal and state levels.22
In the future, however, North Dakota may have an impact in reversing those
judicial tendencies in the child custody sphere, placing less emphasis on
sexual orientation in child custody matters.23 Over time, North Dakota may
completely erase the stigmatization of gay and lesbian parents.24 Courts
would then emphasize only the most important factors in child custody
matters, including the best interests of the child and the quality of parenting
itself; but until that day surfaces, it must be determined why courts have
historically denied parental rights and child custody to homosexual
parents.25

18. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 (exploring the Damron decision).
19. See discussion infra Part IV (describing Damron as a model for future North Dakota
child custody cases).
20. See discussion infra Part V (discussing the use of a standard that goes beyond that used
in Damron to determine whether to award child custody to a homosexual parent).
21. See Huff, supra note 2, at 699-701 (discussing the courts’ evaluation of the custodial
rights of gay or lesbian parents).
22. See discussion infra Parts II.A & II.B (providing examples of rights denied to homosexual individuals in various federal and state cases).
23. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 696 (arguing that as homosexual parents continue to
press courts to focus less on homosexuality and more on the quality of parenting itself, there will
be less emphasis on sexual orientation). There is likely to be less emphasis on sexual orientation
with an increased use of the middle ground and nexus standards, as well. Id.; see also discussion
infra Part III.B (analyzing three approaches to child custody modification).
24. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 (discussing Damron and the argument that North Dakota
uses a stringent approach, making it difficult for heterosexual parents to prove that homosexuality
will endanger a child). If North Dakota courts continue to follow this approach and as case law
changes, there may be little to no emphasis on homosexuality in the future. Id.
25. See Huff, supra note 2, at 696 (arguing that homosexuality should not be a focus in child
custody cases, because it is unlikely that proof offering to distinguish between homosexual and
heterosexual parenting would be viable); see also discussion infra Part II (reviewing federal and
state cases that have denied rights and child custody to homosexual parents).
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II. A HISTORY OF—AND REASONS FOR—DENYING RIGHTS
AND CUSTODY TO HOMOSEXUAL INDIVIDUALS AND
PARENTS
The reasons that courts deny custody to lesbian and gay parents have
been both numerous and diverse.26 Some of the most oft-quoted reasons to
deny a homosexual parent custody are: (1) the child will become homosexual; (2) the child will adopt socially unaccepted morals as he or she
matures; (3) the child’s peers will ostracize him or her; or (4) the child is
more likely to be molested by a homosexual parent than a heterosexual
parent.27 These reasons for denying custody are viewed as unfounded by
many individuals who advocate for the eradication of court-opined
differences between homosexual and heterosexual parenting fitness. 28
Furthermore, any information that might be gleaned in support of these
conclusions has been extremely limited in terms of social examination.29
However, many state and federal courts have used these and several other
“unfounded” reasons to deny custody to homosexual parents.30 The courts
that use these reasons to deny custody may base custody denials on
homosexual rights-related United States Supreme Court precedent. 31
Discussions relating to societal morals and values are topics that are often
entrenched in some of the Court’s most influential decisions.32
A. CONCERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Historically, legislators and U.S. courts have generally avoided affording rights to gay and lesbian individuals.33 Courts have often discussed the
mores and values of American society, and are further concerned with how
26. David M. Rosenblum, Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV.
1665, 1669-70 (1991).
27. Huff, supra note 2, at 701-02.
28. Id. at 702.
29. See id. (arguing that the reasons set forth by courts to deny custody to homosexual
parents lack factual support).
30. See discussion infra Part II.A (examining the use of morality arguments in United States
Supreme Court and state cases involving homosexual individuals).
31. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (denying readmission of a
former Boy Scouts member to the organization via the New Jersey public accommodation statute
because the private organization, although alleging that it followed a set of mores and standards
disallowing homosexual members, did not fall under the New Jersey statute). See also Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual conduct was unconstitutional, while opining that society tends to view homosexuality as immoral).
32. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (stating that society views homosexuality as
immoral); Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (upholding the mores of the Boy Scouts organization to deny
membership to a former member because of his sexuality).
33. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 640 (stating that a private organization may deny membership
if it deems homosexuality immoral).
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various statutes or laws affording rights to homosexual individuals may
negatively affect those values.34
Recent Supreme Court decisions,
discussed in the following sections, reflect these views.35
1.

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,36 Dale challenged his expulsion from
the Boy Scouts organization.37 The organization discovered that Dale was
homosexual, and to justify his expulsion, averred that “homosexual conduct
is inconsistent with the values [that the Boy Scouts organization] seeks to
instill.”38 Although the New Jersey public accommodations statute forbade
sexual discrimination based on sexual orientation, the United States
Supreme Court held that the statute could not afford redress to the former
member because Boy Scouts of America (Boy Scouts) was a private
organization.39 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court’s opinion and
declared that whether the judiciary disagrees with the organization’s
ideologies was not the issue before the Court; instead, the question was
whether the State of New Jersey could require a private institution such as
the Boy Scouts to readmit a member under the public accommodations
statute.40 Justice Rehnquist suggested that the New Jersey public accommodations statute be applied narrowly to find that the former Boy Scouts
member was justly disbanded due to his sexual orientation.41
Leading the dissent in Dale, Justice Stevens accused the Court of
applying the public accommodations statute too narrowly.42 He stated that
the New Jersey law had previously been applied to “broadly [protect] the
opportunity of all persons to obtain the advantages and privileges ‘of any
place of public accommodation.’”43 Finally, Justice Stevens stated that the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the public accommodations facet
would prohibit discrimination, had not in previous decisions hesitated to
reject discriminatory policies applied by “private schools . . . and labor
organizations.”44 Justice Stevens’ dissent suggested that contrary to the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
Id.
Id. at 644-45 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4 to 5-6 (West Supp. 2000)).
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 678-79.
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majority opinion, Dale deserved redress.45 Justice Stevens’ analysis also
chastised the Court for allowing private organizations to practice discriminatory policies that affected the public generally.46
The United States Supreme Court in Dale seemingly failed to remedy
or alleviate the continuation of discriminatory practices.47 In the next few
years, the Supreme Court faced additional issues surrounding the discriminatory effects of statutes and policies upon homosexual individuals in other
areas of the country.48 Instead of allowing discriminatory practices to continue as in Dale, however, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that
discriminated against gay and lesbian individuals.49
2.

Lawrence v. Texas

In 2003, the Supreme Court considered the rights of gay and lesbian
individuals when the Court analyzed whether a public statute could rightfully interfere with the private lives of persons.50 In Lawrence v. Texas,51 a
Texas statute deemed sexual conduct between members of the same sex a
criminal act.52 In Lawrence, the Court found that the state did not offer a
legitimate interest in interfering with the “personal and private life of the
individual.”53
The Lawrence decision was a step toward recognizing a growing need
for the equal rights of homosexual persons.54 The Court recognized that,
while policies may purport to be directed at prohibiting unfavorable activities of all persons, many laws are unjustly directed to prohibit the actions of
a particular group.55 In Lawrence, gay and lesbian individuals comprised

45. See id. (stating that the Court had not hesitated to reject discriminatory policies in previous decisions, yet here a homosexual individual was discriminated against and the Court upheld
the public accommodation statute).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (holding that a statute criminalizing sodomy was unconstitutional because it discriminated against a targeted group).
49. Id.
50. See id. (stating that “[w]hen a State makes homosexual conduct criminal,” thus interfering with the private lives of individuals, the statute’s only purpose is to discriminate).
51. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
53. Id. at 578.
54. See id. (holding that the Texas statute was unconstitutional because it criminalized private activity). The Court brought the issue of discrimination to the forefront of the discussion in
stating that the statute’s only purpose was to discriminate against homosexuals. Id. The Court
also stressed the need for the right to privacy. Id.
55. Id. at 583.
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the targeted group.56 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reprimanded the state and emphasized the true purpose of the Texas statute:
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime.57
By deeming the Texas statute unconstitutional, the Lawrence decision
promoted a movement in legislation to recognize the rights of homosexual
individuals.58 In fact, since Lawrence was decided, most jurisdictions have
repealed their laws prohibiting non-marital or consensual sexual activity.59
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence departed from Dale’s
precedent, and showed that the private lives of individuals were beginning
to be recognized more readily by state legislatures and judiciaries.60 Unlike
Dale, the Lawrence Court recognized that the sexuality of an individual—
and not merely the sexual activity in which the individual engages—is a
private facet of one’s life, undeserving of public scrutiny and discrimination.61 Thus, the societal value of privacy became an important topic
regarding gay and lesbian rights.62
3.

Societal Values in Federal and State Decisions

Although Dale and Lawrence do not directly adhere to the topic of the
rights of homosexual parents and the best interests of children in custody
hearings, the decisions address how the Court generally views homosexuality.63 The cases also address, in the majority and dissenting opinions, the
mores and values of society and the struggles of gay and lesbian individuals

56. Id.
57. Id. at 578.
58. See Jennifer Naeger, And Then There Were None: The Repeal of Sodomy Laws After
Lawrence v. Texas and Its Effect on the Custody and Visitation Rights of Gay and Lesbian
Parents, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 408-19 (2004) (outlining Lawrence and its effect on similar
sodomy laws and the parental rights of homosexual parents).
59. Id. at 422.
60. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575-76 (stressing the importance of the right to privacy).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally id. at 563 (stating that society generally views homosexuality as immoral);
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (stating that homosexuals may be denied
readmission to the Boy Scouts if homosexuality is deemed immoral).
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in both private and public spheres.64 The discussion of both public and
private areas is necessary, as both are involved in domestic court deliberations of child custody.65 In considering child custody and child placement,
courts continue to analyze public approval of homosexuality and how
children will be affected in their private environments.66
The moral and value issues discussed in United States Supreme Court
cases are also considered by state courts in child custody cases.67 In the
Nebraska case of Hassenstab v. Hassenstab,68 for example, a woman’s exhusband sought to modify child custody when he discovered that she was
openly homosexual.69 A Nebraska child custody law required “[t]he party
seeking modification of child custody [to bear] the burden of showing that a
material change in circumstances has occurred.” 70 While the woman’s exhusband offered that an openly homosexual relationship was sufficient to
justify a change in custody, the Nebraska Court of Appeals held that homosexuality alone was not a factor in modifying custody; however, homosexuality could be considered in addition to other factors, including the “moral
fitness of the child’s parents and the parents’ sexual conduct.”71
Hassenstab emanated the sentiments of mores, values, and negative
responses to homosexual “activities” discussed in Dale and Lawrence. 72
The Nebraska Appellate Court’s holding, however, was a movement toward
furthering gay and lesbian parental rights and a realization of what truly is
in the best interests of the child, because the court determined that homosexuality “does not render [a] parent unfit or require an award of custody to
the other parent.”73 The Nebraska Appellate Court is one of several courts,
however, that have expressed concern with the idea that homosexual
64. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563 (finding that many Americans believe homosexuality is
immoral); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 640 (reiterating that the Boy Scouts deem homosexuality as
immoral).
65. See Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368, 371-73 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (reviewing
both public, social behavior and the private sexual conduct of lesbian partners in determining
whether child custody modification should occur).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (explaining society’s general views regarding homosexuality); see also Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 374 (Hannon, J., dissenting) (stating that homosexuality should be considered because the parents’ moral fitness, due to homosexuality, may
have a bearing on the issue).
68. 570 N.W.2d 368 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997).
69. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 372.
70. Id. at 371.
71. Id. at 372.
72. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568 (discussing society’s views on homosexuality); Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 665 (discussing the morals that the Boy Scouts organization
seeks to instill in its members); Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 374 (Hannon, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the morality of homosexuality should be considered in determining custody).
73. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 372.
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parents have the capacity to endanger children, and therefore authorize
child custody modification.74
As previously mentioned, courts follow the lead of United States
Supreme Court precedent and discuss the concept of morality as grounds
for child custody and custody modification.75 Although it is appropriate for
a court to carefully evaluate morality as an important consideration in many
matters, courts’ holdings often suggest that homosexuality is in itself
immoral, thus rendering homosexual parents unfit to raise children. 76
Moreover, many courts seemingly believe that the morals and values of
homosexual parents differ from the morals and values of heterosexual
parents.77
4. Other Reasons Courts Cite to Deny Custody to Gay and
Lesbian Parents
There are many reasons, aside from moral considerations, that courts
provide when deciding whether to award or modify custody favoring
homosexual parents.78 One reason that courts may not grant custody to a
homosexual parent is possible stigmatization of the child for his or her
parent’s sexual orientation.79 Lynn D. Wardle, proponent of “traditional
families,” has stated: “The legalization of homosexual parenting, essentially
rendering sexual conduct of a parent a presumably irrelevant factor for
purposes of child custody . . . would constitute a significant shift in the legal
and social assumptions and legal model of parenting.”80
Of the reasons offered to deny lesbian and gay parents the custody of
their children, most arguably represent speculative social fear of homosexuality.81 Furthermore, the idea that Wardle expresses, that the legalization of
homosexual parenting would corrupt social values and change social

74. See McGriff v. McGriff, 99 P.3d 111, 113-14 (Idaho 2004) (discussing a mother’s wish
to conceal her ex-husband’s homosexuality from her children in a child custody dispute);
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (holding that homosexuality has the
potential to harm children); Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d at 372 (discussing the morality of
homosexual individuals and homosexual relationships).
75. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (stating that society often views homosexuality as
immoral); Dale, 530 U.S. at 673 (stating that the standards of morality of a private organization
may warrant the denial of readmission of a homosexual man).
76. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 673 (allowing the Boy Scouts organization to deny readmission to a former Boy Scouts member because the organization believed that homosexuality was
immoral and did not further the values that the organization sought to instill).
77. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1669-70.
78. Id. at 1667-84.
79. Id.
80. Wardle, supra note 5, at 838.
81. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1677-78.
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assumptions, is common, but may be negated.82 Contrary to Wardle’s
belief, there are many reasons to favor full legalization of homosexual
parenting and award homosexual parents child custody.83 Some arguments
in favor of the full legalization of homosexual parenting include the eradication of social stigmatization and the formation of strong and healthy
families.84
The acknowledgment of lesbian and gay parents would also promote
adept—and therefore prevent inept—parenting.85 For example, suppose a
court were to focus on the homosexuality of a parent and offer child custody to the child’s socially accepted heterosexual parent.86 That child may
be faced with a future of inept parenting.87 Courts may simply assume that
the heterosexual parent, unlike the child’s homosexual parent, is not
strapped with social rejection and will therefore provide a more caring and
stable environment.88
Like the court in the above example, advocates of traditional families
and heterosexual parenting feel that this parent-child relationship is necessary for the healthy upbringing of a child.89 This notion of necessity is
connected to the belief that only heterosexuals are entitled to marriage and
parenting. It is also attached to the idea that the presence of both male and
female parents is essential for a child’s healthy development.90 Proponents
of heterosexual-only parenting allege that “recent research suggest[s] that a
daddy and a mommy together provide by far the best environment in which
a child may be reared.”91 Proponents, such as Wardle, also argue that the
traditional family best serves child development because “[s]eparation of

82. See generally id. at 1665-66 (arguing that misunderstandings of homosexuality and
societal fears contribute to the idea that homosexual parenting will harm children).
83. Huff, supra note 2, at 695-99.
84. Id.
85. See id. (stating that strong families may be formed with homosexual parents, and that
homosexuals do not lack the parenting skills that heterosexual parents possess).
86. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining the possible negative impact
resulting from forcing a child into a heterosexual household versus a homosexual household).
87. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 696-99 (suggesting that homosexual parents are just
as capable as heterosexual parents at raising children in a safe and healthy living environment). If
Huff’s sentiments ring true, and a child were placed in a household simply because that household
was headed by a heterosexual parent, a court would lose sight of the child’s best interests. Id.
The main focus would be on sexuality rather than the environment that the parents provide. Id.
Thus, the focus of the court would move from the best interests of the child to the parent’s
sexuality. Id.
88. Id.
89. Wardle, supra note 5, at 857.
90. Jenny Stokes, Homosexuality: Same-Sex Parenting (2007), http://www.saltshakers.org.
au/html/P/9/B/235/; see also Wardle, supra note 5, at 857 (arguing that children need both a
mother and a father to ensure the best possible living environment).
91. Wardle, supra note 5, at 857.
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children from their fathers is ‘the leading cause of declining child wellbeing in our society.’”92 However, according to advocates for the recognition of homosexual parenting and otherwise diverse family relationships,
these statements are little more than overbroad generalizations lacking
fundamental and factual support.93 Furthermore, the proponents of heterosexual-only, two-parent traditional families provide only arguments discussing the decline of societal mores and an inferred increase in homosexual
parenting, concrete evidence of which is limited.94
With all of the aforementioned arguments favoring limits to homosexual parenting, many courts have reached conclusions in child custody
and custody-related matters that appease society’s fears or dislikes of
homosexuality.95 This practice does little to further the best interests of the
child or parental rights.96 Instead, the practice perpetuates the misunderstanding that homosexual parents provide fewer benefits or somehow offer
substandard care for their children when compared to heterosexual
parents.97
It is imperative that courts endorse the most just approach toward these
issues for both children and parents.98 To reach a just result, courts should
not apply standards implying a difference between homosexual and
heterosexual individuals.99 If courts were to discontinue distinguishing
between homosexual and heterosexual individuals, child custody cases
would focus more on the child and less on the parents, and custody matters
would less likely result in undue distinctions between homosexual and
heterosexual parenting.100 The United States Supreme Court in Meyer v.
State of Nebraska101 can be said to have supported this just approach as
early as 1923: “[L]iberty . . . denotes . . . the right of the individual to . . .

92. Id. at 859.
93. See Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 2676 (citing Collins v. Collins, No. 87-238-II, 1988
Tenn. App. LEXIS 123 (Tenn. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (explaining that courts’ fears of homosexual
parenting often arise from the fear that homosexuality is a “learned behavior” and that children
would “choose” a homosexual “lifestyle,” and refuting these fears with an explanation of psychological studies providing otherwise)).
94. See id. at 1666-69 (stating generally that society believes that homosexuality is harmful
and will harm children). Very little is offered to prove that homosexuality in itself will harm
children, because the notions of harm are based mostly on fear of homosexuality. Id.
95. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 701-02 (arguing that courts often find differences
between homosexual and heterosexual parents and focus on their sexuality, regardless of the
parents’ individual parenting skills).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. The established doctrine is that this
liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public
interest.”102 Although courts may profess to protect “public interest” or the
moral fitness of American citizens by denying custody to homosexual
parents, protection is a fallacy when it interferes with the liberty to have and
raise a family.103
B. NORTH DAKOTA’S POSITION ON HOMOSEXUAL PARENTING IN
CHILD CUSTODY MATTERS
Several North Dakota cases have determined whether to award child
custody to homosexual parents.104 The North Dakota Supreme Court’s
decisions in these cases provide a wide spectrum of opinions regarding
homosexual parenting.105 Damron v. Damron, the most recent child custody decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court to overrule a per se bar
to awarding custody to a homosexual parent, may offer an updated
approach in determining child custody matters.106
1.

Child Custody and Homosexual Parenting Prior to Damron

In concert with the traditional view that homosexuality has a negative
affect on the mores of society, until recently North Dakota case law
followed the 1981 child custody ruling of Jacobson v. Jacobson.107 In
Jacobson, a man sought to modify child custody when he discovered that
his ex-wife Sandra was a lesbian, and believed that her homosexual
relationship with another woman would have a negative impact on their

102. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
103. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 701-02 (stating that courts place too much emphasis
on the morality of homosexuality and should focus instead on a parent’s ability to raise a child
successfully and in a healthy environment).
104. See, e.g., Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875 (opining that
the homosexuality of a mother was not a per se bar to child custody in a custody modification
case); Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 835 (N.D. 1993) (holding that although the father
harmed his children by instilling his ideas about homosexuality in them, the father retained
custody because homosexuality could be considered as a factor in the child custody dispute);
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 79-82 (N.D. 1981) (discussing whether homosexuality will
harm children in a child custody modification dispute).
105. See Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (holding that homosexuality is a per se bar to child
custody); but see Damron, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality is not a per se bar to
child custody).
106. See Damron, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (determining that homosexuality is not a reason to
deny a parent custody of a child, and holding that the parent seeking child custody modification
must provide evidence sufficient to show that the child’s well-being is in danger).
107. 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981).
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children.108 The North Dakota Supreme Court stated, “we believe the
homosexuality of Sandra is the overriding factor.”109 The court concluded
that, since both parents were otherwise equally fit to care for their children,
it was in the best interests of the children to be placed with their father.110
The court found that the mother’s homosexuality would potentially have an
adverse affect on the children’s moral well-being.111
In addition to finding that homosexuality alone may harm children,
North Dakota case law has offered comparisons as to the difference
between heterosexual and homosexual parenting.112 In Lapp v. Lapp,113 a
mother moved for child custody modification when she discovered that her
ex-husband had entered into a new relationship.114 She declared that her
ex-husband’s decision to move in with another woman merited a change in
circumstances that was significant enough to require modification.115 The
mother further argued that because her ex-husband was living with a
woman to whom he was not married, the living arrangement would be
detrimental to their child.116 The North Dakota Supreme Court declared
that the detrimental effect of the father’s relationship would be only speculative.117 The court also distinguished the case from Jacobson.118 In Lapp,
both individuals vying for custody were heterosexual.119 In Jacobson, the
custodial parent, who ultimately lost custody, was homosexual.120 The
Lapp court found this distinction important, stating, “the fact that the mother was involved in a homosexual relationship in Jacobson was of major
importance in our decision.”121 Therefore, it may be inferred that if the
father in Lapp was living with a man instead of a woman, his homosexual

108. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 78.
109. Id. at 80.
110. Id. at 80-81.
111. See id. at 79 (reiterating the trial court’s concern that the children would “suffer from
the ‘slings and arrows’ of a disapproving society”).
112. See Lapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d 350, 352 (N.D. 1983) (stating that the relationship of a
homosexual individual may have a detrimental effect on children, and distinguishing homosexual
parents from heterosexual parents).
113. 336 N.W.2d 350.
114. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d at 351.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 352-53.
118. Id. at 352.
119. Id. at 350.
120. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 78 (1981).
121. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d at 352.
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relationship may have provided grounds for child custody modification in
Lapp as it did in Jacobson.122
In Johnson v. Schlotman,123 the North Dakota Supreme Court again
discussed homosexuality as a major part of its decision.124 In Schlotman,
decided in 1993, the court denied an openly homosexual mother custody of
her children.125 When the mother moved to modify custody, the court
spoke about her relationship and living arrangement with another
woman.126
Although homosexuality encompassed much of the court’s discussion,
the parties to the case also focused on the immorality of homosexuality.127
The father in Schlotman had ingrained his beliefs about the immorality of
homosexuality in his children.128 The court reprimanded the children’s
father for “expos[ing] the children to his belief that homosexuality is deviant and is not to be tolerated,” and for turning his children “away from the
other parent by poisoning the well.” Although the court stressed that “bigotry, in whatever form, on the part of a parent is a matter affecting the best
interests of the children,” the court declined to modify the custody order in
favor of the children’s homosexual mother.129 The court concluded that it
would be in the children’s best interests to remain with their father, even
though, against the best interests of the children, he would likely continue
to “poison the well.”130
2.

Damron v. Damron

Twenty-one years after Schlotman was decided, Damron v. Damron
overruled the “presumption of harm to children living in a lesbian household and . . . any requirement for evidence of actual or potential harm to the

122. See id. at 352 (stating that Jacobson is distinguishable from the present case due to the
homosexual relationship in Jacobson); Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 78 (modifying a custody order in
favor of the noncustodial parent, and finding that the children’s well-being was in danger due to
the custodial parent’s homosexual relationship).
123. 502 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1993).
124. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d at 832.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 834.
127. See id. at 832 (addressing the children’s father’s concern that due to their mother’s
homosexuality, she would be unfit as a parent); see also id. at 833 (discussing testimony regarding
the children’s father’s belief that homosexuality was “deviant behavior that should not be
tolerated”); id. (recalling expert testimony regarding the “propriety of [offering] custody” to a
homosexual parent).
128. Id. at 834-35.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 834.
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children” created by Jacobson.131 In Damron, a father moved to modify the
custody order of the trial court when he discovered that his wife was homosexual.132 He relied on the court’s ruling in Jacobson to state that a homosexual parent could not create a living environment that would be in the
best interests of the child.133 The North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron,
however, focused not primarily on the homosexuality of the mother, but on
the best interests of the child.134 The court further discussed the aversion
that most jurisdictions tend to carry toward modifying custody rulings.135
The children’s father disagreed; he believed that modification was
necessary and testified that the mother’s relationship would have a detrimental affect on the children’s “moral character.”136 The Damron court,
however, required actual evidence showing that the children would be
harmed, and stated that the father presented none.137 Therefore, the court
held that no modification would take place.138
As the Damron holding suggests, North Dakota courts have begun to
recognize the best interests of the children and the rights of homosexual
parents.139 In fact, the North Dakota Supreme Court mentioned both considerations in the Damron decision.140 The court stated that its purpose was
“to look solely to the best interest[s] of the particular children in the case
before the [c]ourt.”141 In overruling the presumption that a homosexual
household would harm children, the court recognized the rights of the
parent.142 Unlike Jacobson, the Damron court’s decision did not allow
children to be as easily removed from the homosexual parent’s home.143 As

131. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 9, 670 N.W.2d 871, 875; see also Jacobson v.
Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, at 81-82 (holding that modification may take place due to the custodial
parent’s homosexual relationship).
132. Damron, ¶ 2, 670 N.W.2d at 873.
133. Id.
134. Id. ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d at 874.
135. Id. ¶ 6.
136. Id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Compare Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (stating that homosexuality was a significant factor in denying custody), with Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876
(holding that homosexuality was not grounds for modifying child custody absent actual proof that
the child was harmed).
140. Damron, ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
141. Id. ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873.
142. See generally id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (stating that homosexuality is not grounds for
custody modification, and inferring a parent’s right to privacy to engage in a private relationship
unless that relationship endangers the child).
143. See id. (refusing to modify custody based on homosexuality when the father had not
offered actual proof of harm to the children); but see Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (modifying
child custody because of the mother’s homosexual relationship).

1014

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 84:999

Damron suggests in overruling Jacobson, the rights of the parent may be an
inevitable consideration in child custody matters; however, the best
interests of the child continue to be the central theme in child custody
concerns.144
III. LEGAL STANDARDS AND OTHER CHILD CUSTODY
CONSIDERATIONS
While the best interests of the child factors are by far the most important considerations in child custody matters, courts consider various other
factors when determining what truly will be in a child’s best interests.145 In
awarding custody to homosexual parents, courts often look to the sexuality
of the parent to determine whether the parent’s sexuality or relationships
will harm the child in any way.146 To reach this conclusion, courts use the
per se, middle ground, or nexus approaches to award custody to either the
heterosexual or homosexual parent.147
A. FACTORS DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
The Damron court of course could not have reached its conclusion to
overrule Jacobson had it not analyzed statutes and case law regarding child
custody.148 In initial child custody hearings, a court generally has discretion
to make custody determinations as it sees fit, while using accepted standards.149 A court must, however, determine custody in regard to the best
interests of the child.150 This has long been an established rule, not only in
North Dakota, but in nearly all state courts.151
In North Dakota, when the best interests of the child are found in a
preliminary custody hearing, the court may modify that ruling at any time to
144. See N.D. CENT. CODE §14-09-06.6 (2007) (providing that post-judgment modification
is necessary to serve the best interests of the child); Damron, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873 (“[The]
function of the court in matters of child custody is to look solely to the best interest[s] of the
particular children.”); LINDA ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRAC. & PROC. § 4:4 (2006) (listing
various factors that courts look to when serving the child’s best interests).
145. See discussion infra Part III.A (examining factors which courts look to when
determining the best interests of the child).
146. See discussion infra Part III.B (explaining the legal standards that courts use in child
custody matters involving homosexual parents).
147. Id.
148. See Damron, ¶¶ 6-12, 670 N.W.2d at 874-76 (citing § 14-09-06; §§ 14-09-06.6(5)(b) to
(6)(a)-(b) & 14-09-06.6(8) (2005); Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, ¶ 12, 561 N.W.2d 612, 616)
(suggesting authority to overrule Jacobson).
149. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22.1 (2007) (defining the scope of the court’s
discretion).
150. Larson v. Dutton, 172 N.W. 869, 871 (N.D. 1919).
151. See ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4 (providing a list of states that focus on the best
interests of the child).
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ensure the best interests of the child.152 When the court determines the best
interests of the child, it also determines the fitness of the parents.153 The
parents each have “equal rights with regard to the care, custody, education,
and control of the children.”154
Upon preliminary custody determination, a court may modify the
custody order no sooner than two years after the initial custody order unless
“[t]he child’s present environment may endanger the child’s physical or
emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development[.]”155 A
court may also modify the initial custody order before the two-year
condition if it determines that the environment in which the child is living is
otherwise unfit and will endanger the child.156 A change in custody will be
ordered if it will ensure that the best interests of the child are satisfied.157
Custody may also be modified if a material change has occurred in the
circumstances of the custody of that child.158 When a parent wishes to
modify a prior custody ruling due to a “material change in circumstances,”
the burden of proof is on that parent to show that significant changes have
occurred so as to justify modification.159 Courts perform a two-step analysis when confronted with a request for modification on these grounds.160 A
court first determines whether a significant change in circumstances has
indeed occurred, followed by whether that change requires modification in
order to meet the best interests of the child.161
North Dakota’s approach to child custody is an approach that is
uniform throughout the country.162 The best interests of the child are
primary conditions requiring fulfillment in preliminary custody hearings.163
Modification proceedings occur in the same manner.164 Courts look to
whether a substantial change has occurred to warrant modification.165

152. § 14-05-22.1.
153. Id. § 14-09-06.
154. Id.
155. Id. § 14-09-06.6(3)(b) (2005).
156. Id. §§ 14-09-06.6(5)(b); 14-09-06.6(6)(a)-(b).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. § 14-09-06.6(8).
160. Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, ¶ 12, 561 N.W.2d 612, 616.
161. Id.
162. See ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4 (offering a list of many states, including North
Dakota, that focus on the best interests of the child).
163. Id.
164. Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual
or Lesbian Parent, 62 A.L.R.5TH 591, 591 (1998).
165. See id. (stating that child custody modifications require a showing that changes have
taken place, thus proving that modification will be in the child’s best interests).
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Courts tend to follow an additional set of criteria in finding the best
interests of the child in both preliminary and custody modification
hearings.166 The criteria include the quality of the child’s home environment, the parents’ involvement and influence in the child’s life, and the
wishes of both the parents and child, if the child has reached a sufficient
maturity level to offer his or her opinion on the matter.167 Among the
factors that a court may consider in finding the child’s best interests,
however, the sexual orientation of the parent should not be considered.168
Courts also should not consider the private sexual conduct of the parent
unless it is proven that the child is harmed by such conduct, or that the
private conduct interferes with the parent’s ability to provide the requisite
level of care and nurturing necessary to child development.169
The rules set forth above may be applied and analyzed pursuant to
North Dakota child custody cases.170 As introduced in Part II.B, the noncustodial parents in Jacobson, Lapp, Schlotman, and Damron sought
custody modification due to a change in circumstances.171 In each case,
either the custodial parents’ homosexuality was discovered, or the parents’
sexual conduct was argued to be a circumstance sufficient to modify a
custody order.172 Although the North Dakota Supreme Court arrived at a
different conclusion in Damron than its predecessors Jacobson, Lapp, and
Schlotman, the court announced the same reason for declining to modify the
custody order in Damron as in the other child custody cases.173 The reason
offered was that “the function of the court in matters of child custody is to
look solely to the best interest[s] of the particular children in the case before
the [c]ourt.”174
The Damron result shows that the North Dakota Supreme Court
applied the aforementioned criteria regarding the wishes of the child and
parent, as well as the child’s home environment to reach the conclusion that
the best interest of the children would best be served by remaining in their
mother’s custody; however, Damron tended to adapt a slight variation of
the rule that the sexuality of the parent may not be considered by the court

166. ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See discussion supra Part II.B (analyzing North Dakota cases that illustrate custody
determinations and homosexual parenting issues in North Dakota).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d 871, 873.
174. Id.
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in a custody modification hearing.175 The Damron court found that the
sexuality of the custodial parent may not be considered as grounds for
modifying custody, unless the parent attempting to modify could show that
the environment in which the child is living actually endangers the child’s
well-being.176 Homosexuality, taken alone, was not to be considered as
grounds for modification because it did not establish that a child would be
harmed.177
The best interests of the child are the most cited considerations in child
custody and custody modification hearings.178 The sexuality of a parent
and the parent’s private sexual conduct is also often considered, however.179
The effect that this consideration has on custody results is the focus of Part
III.B.180
B. COMMON LEGAL STANDARDS USED BY COURTS IN CHILD
CUSTODY HEARINGS INVOLVING HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS
As discussed in Part III.A, courts generally agree that the best interests
of the child are the most important considerations in child custody
proceedings.181 Although courts agree on these factors, courts tend to
follow different legal standards when determining the effect that a parent’s
homosexuality will have on the outcome of a child custody or custody
modification case.182 It may be inferred that the use of these different
standards to award or deny custody does not necessarily mean that the
courts focus on the best interests of the child as purported.183 Nevertheless,
the various standards, including the per se, middle ground, and nexus
approaches, continue to be applied.184

175. ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4.
176. Damron, ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
177. Id. at 875.
178. See ELROD, supra note 144, § 4:4 (stating that Rhode Island, New York, Wyoming,
Mississippi, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, North Dakota, and many other state courts look to the
best interests of the child).
179. Trainor, supra note 164, § 3[a] (citing Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996)).
In Tucker, the court stated that a mother’s cohabitation with her partner demonstrated a lack of
“moral example.” Tucker, 910 P.2d at 1213.
180. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the per se, middle ground, and nexus
approaches).
181. Huff, supra note 2, at 699.
182. Id.
183. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1686-87.
184. Huff, supra note 2, at 699.
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The Per Se Approach

Perhaps the harshest standard toward homosexual parents in custody
and custody modification cases, the per se approach allows the court to
deny custody to a homosexual parent simply upon the basis that the parent
is homosexual.185 In using this infrequently applied approach, courts look
merely to whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the parent is
homosexual when determining the best interests of the child.186 Upon
finding that a parent is homosexual, a court infers that the child’s living
environment is unfit, and the court either denies initial custody to the
homosexual parent or grants the heterosexual parent’s motion to modify a
previous custody ruling.187
Jacobson illustrates the premise of the per se approach.188 Although
the North Dakota Supreme Court opined in Jacobson that homosexuality
was a “significant factor” to deny custody to the homosexual parent, the
court ruled that homosexuality was against societal mores, and thus
rendered a homosexual parent unfit to provide a healthy living environment
for a child.189 The per se approach is rarely applied by courts in modern
child custody matters, however.190 Many courts instead follow the middle
ground approach.191
2.

The Middle Ground Approach

Courts that follow the middle ground approach consider a parent’s
homosexuality as one factor amidst other factors to determine the best
interests of the child.192 Using the middle ground approach, homosexuality
alone is not usually a reason to deny custody to a parent.193 A court may
not refuse custody to that parent “without actually finding clear evidence of
any detriment to the child.”194 Courts applying this standard often determine that a child will be socially or morally harmed as a result of living
with a homosexual parent.195
185. Id. at 699-700.
186. Id. at 700.
187. Id.
188. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (holding that homosexuality
is a per se bar to child custody in custody determinations, because the environment provided by a
homosexual parent has the potential to harm a child).
189. Id. at 80, 82 (emphasis added).
190. Huff, supra note 2, at 699.
191. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the middle ground approach).
192. Huff, supra note 2, at 699.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 700.
195. Id.
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Schlotman offers an illustration of the middle ground approach.196
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court scolded the children’s father in
Schlotman for his bigoted comments about homosexuality and for perpetuating those sentiments among his children, the court allowed the children to
remain with their father when their homosexual mother sought modification.197 The court considered the parents generally equally fit to raise the
children despite the father’s behavior, but the court allowed the father to
retain custody partially because the children would be “embarrassed” by
their mother.198 Thus, homosexuality was a factor that was used to deny
custody to the children’s mother.199 While many courts apply the middle
ground approach to determine custody matters, yet another standard is
applied: the nexus standard.200
3.

The Nexus Standard

The nexus standard, potentially the most favorable standard to homosexual parents seeking child custody, requires actual and real evidence of
harm to the child as a result of the parent’s sexual orientation.201 Unlike the
per se approach, the parent’s homosexuality is not the sole deciding factor
as to whether custody may be granted.202 The nexus standard is similar to
the middle ground approach in that the homosexuality of the parent is a
factor considered among many others.203 However, the nexus standard is
unlike the middle ground approach in that homosexuality is considered as a
factor only if that factor is deemed and proven to impede the child’s best
interests.204
The nexus standard is viewed as the “most direct application of the
traditional ‘best interest[s] of the child’ standard, because it does not create
an inference that a parent’s homosexuality itself has a detrimental impact on
the child’s upbringing.”205 While homosexuality may be viewed as a
possible harm to a child’s best interests under the middle ground approach,
it may not be a reason to deny child custody or custody modification under
the nexus standard unless a parent’s homosexuality would clearly interfere
196. See Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 833 (N.D. 1993) (stating that
homosexuality may be considered in child custody).
197. Id. at 834.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the facets of the nexus standard).
201. Huff, supra note 2, at 700-01.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1687.
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with a child’s well-being.206 The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision
in Damron may provide an illustration of the nexus standard.207
4.

North Dakota’s Standard, as Set Forth in Damron

The most recent North Dakota child custody case alluding to the use of
any one of the standards above is Damron.208 In Damron, the North Dakota
Supreme Court did not adopt the per se approach.209 The court explicitly
stated that “a custodial parent’s homosexual household is not grounds for
modifying custody.”210 And, as previously stated, the per se approach
allows the court to deny custody to a homosexual parent solely because the
parent is homosexual.211
Whether the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the middle ground
or nexus approach to reach its conclusion in Damron is yet to be
determined.212 The court cited decisions of other courts, alluding to use of
the middle ground approach, when it stated that “[o]ther courts generally
have recognized that, in the absence of evidence of actual or potential harm
to the children, a parent’s homosexual relationship, by itself, is not
determinative of custody.”213 The words “by itself” make it appear as
though those courts, in compliance with the middle ground approach, allow
homosexuality to be considered as one factor, among others, in determining
child custody and custody modification.214 While the North Dakota
Supreme Court alluded to the use of the middle ground standard by other
courts, the Damron court stressed that evidence of an environment detrimental to the child’s best interests is imperative to child custody and
custody modification claims.215 Furthermore, the court repeatedly asserted

206. Id.
207. See discussion infra Part III.B.4 (discussing Damron’s use of the nexus approach, as
opposed to the per se or middle ground approaches).
208. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d 871, 876.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Huff, supra note 2, at 699.
212. See Damron, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (overruling the “presumption of harm to
children” living under the care of a homosexual parent, and announcing the rules of other courts to
determine a more appropriate rule to be applied in Damron).
213. Id.
214. Huff, supra note 2, at 700.
215. See Damron, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (offering the rules of other courts regarding the
custody of homosexual parents, and stating that the party moving for a child custody change under
the applicable North Dakota statutes must show that custody modification is “necessary to serve
the best interests of the children”).
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that the best interests of the child should be the main focus in such
proceedings.216
The court’s persistence in stating that the child’s best interests are the
main and only focus makes the Damron decision one that attaches less
stigmatization to homosexual parenting than the Jacobson and Schlotman
analyses.217 Furthermore, the Damron decision and language of the nexus
standard are similar to standards used to award custody to heterosexual
parents in cases where no homosexual parent is involved.218 Although the
court did not explicitly state which approach it used, the Damron decision
appears to have been reached using the nexus standard.219 This conclusion
may be drawn because the court discussed the homosexual relationship of
the mother as merely one possible factor among many others in modifying
custody.220 Furthermore, the court looked to the homosexuality of the
mother only as a possible factor when the children’s father specifically
argued that the mother’s homosexual relationship would be detrimental to
the children’s well-being.221 However, the Damron court stated that homosexuality may be considered as a factor only when the father provides
“evidence of actual or potential harm to the children,” and the children’s
father could not offer this evidence.222 The court’s decision in Damron, in
applying the modern nexus standard, may provide a model to be considered
in future custody matters in North Dakota.223
IV. DAMRON AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE NORTH DAKOTA CASES
As previously stated, most courts maintain that the primary focus in
child custody cases is the best interests of the child.224 However, in many
custody cases in which homosexual parents are involved, courts also
216. Id.
217. Compare Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality cannot be
grounds for custody modification), with Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981)
(holding that a homosexual relationship may be considered as grounds for modification).
218. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that the noncustodial parent did not
offer proof sufficient to show that the relationship of the homosexual parent would endanger the
children); see also Lapp v. Lapp, 336 N.W.2d 350, 353 (N.D. 1983) (stating that a father’s
cohabitation with a woman did not mandate custody modification absent a showing of detriment
to the child’s best interests).
219. Damron, ¶ 10, 670 N.W.2d at 875.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing Damron as a model for future child custody
cases).
224. See Damron, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d at 873 (stating that the focus of the court should be the
child’s best interests); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 80 (N.D. 1981) (enumerating
various factors affecting the best interests of the child).
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discuss the relationships and sexual orientation of the child’s gay or lesbian
parent.225 The fact that a parent is homosexual should not be an issue in
child custody cases unless a parent’s relationship in general directly interferes with the best interests of the child.226 Likewise, the homosexuality of
a parent should not be a factor in the outcome of the custody dispute in
making initial custody or custody modification determinations.227
The discussion of parents’ private lives places great burdens on homosexual parents striving to obtain or maintain custody of their children.228
The consideration of homosexuality, rather than the ability of an individual
to parent successfully, discounts a homosexual parent’s ability to raise his
or her children.229 This consideration arguably perpetuates social misunderstandings and fears of homosexuality, because it implies that the parenting
skills of homosexual and heterosexual individuals are unequal.230 While the
child’s best interests continue to form the basis of courts’ custody determinations, so too does the issue of whether a homosexual parent may further
those interests.231 A court’s conclusion, therefore, hinges on the acceptable
balance between the best interests of the child, and the rights to privacy and
to raise children, as shown in Lawrence and Meyer.232
A. THE RIGHTS OF THE PARENT
It is true that the child’s best interests are important facets in child
custody matters.233 Parents’ rights, however, must not be discounted.234
The fear that a parent may lose his or her child may be one of the most
wrenching experiences that a parent faces.235 In fact, some homosexual

225. See Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 834 (N.D. 1993) (discussing, at great
length, the father’s views and societal attitudes toward homosexuality, and how homosexuality
may affect children in child custody matters); Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (opining that the mores
of society dictate the need to keep children with the heterosexual parent).
226. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 1666.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Huff, supra note 2, at 696.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398400 (1923); Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d 871, 874; see also discussion
infra Part III.A (analyzing the fundamental rights to privacy and to have and raise children, as
supplied by Lawrence v. Texas and Meyer v. Nebraska, respectively).
233. See Larson v. Dutton, 172 N.W.2d 869, 871 (N.D. 1919) (explaining that the child’s
best interests is the court’s utmost concern).
234. See generally D.L. Hawley, 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d Custody and Visitation of
Children By Gay and Lesbian Parents 403 § 19 (2007) (“Sexual orientation alone is not a
sufficient basis to modify parental rights and responsibilities.”).
235. Id.

2008]

NOTE

1023

parents facing child custody issues avoid disclosing the fact that they are
homosexual in order to keep their children if they believe that courts will
deny them custody.236 Several constitutional arguments favor the elimination of the additional requirements that gay and lesbian parents face in order
to obtain and maintain custody of their children.237
The argument that a person has a constitutional right to equal protection was discussed in the appellant’s brief in Damron.238 The appellant’s
brief stated that “where a classification burdens a fundamental right or
targets a suspect class, strict scrutiny is applied to ensure that the discrimination is necessary and narrowly[]tailored to advance a compelling governmental purpose.”239 It has been debated, however, whether homosexuality
is a fundamental right.240 The United States Supreme Court generally
avoids the topic.241
Whether a parent is homosexual or heterosexual does not remove that
parent’s constitutional and fundamental right to bear and raise children.242
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court opined that an
individual has the right to “establish a home and bring up children.”243
Through Meyer, it may be argued today that a right to bring up children
allows a parent to raise his or her child whether the parent is homosexual or
heterosexual, provided that the upbringing does not interfere with the best
interests of the child.244 Therefore, even if a court would not recognize a
person’s fundamental right with regard to sexual orientation, a court must
recognize a parent’s right to raise his or her children in a private home
setting.245

236. Id.
237. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, 565-67 (discussing the rights of homosexuals, but not
reaching a conclusion as to whether sexuality is a fundamental right); Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 663 (1966) (finding that fundamental rights are protected by the Equal
Protection Clause, even though not explicitly stated in the Constitution); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398400 (asserting that the right to bear and raise children is a fundamental interest); Rosenblum,
supra note 26, at 1696 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399) (“[The] right to ‘bring up children’ is
within the scope of [F]ourteenth [A]mendment protection.”).
238. Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 4.
239. Id.
240. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (holding that a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual
sexual acts was unconstitutional).
241. See id. (deeming a Texas statute unconstitutional because it criminalized sodomy, but
not stating whether a fundamental right exists).
242. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398-400 (holding that individuals have a fundamental right to bear
and raise children).
243. Id.
244. See id. (holding that it is a fundamental right to raise and bear children, but not
discussing sexuality in reference to who may or may not raise children).
245. Id.
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It may further be argued that a classification burdening a suspect class
requires either a heightened or strict scrutiny analysis, the most stringent
forms of analyses.246 Suspect classes are so deemed because they are
“saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.”247 Homosexual individuals fit the label “suspect class” because
they have long been the subject of discriminatory statutes, such as that seen
in Lawrence.248
Strict scrutiny analysis mandates a necessary and narrowly tailored discriminatory purpose, which furthers a compelling governmental interest.249
If a court modified a child custody ruling due to a parent’s sexual
orientation, and therefore his or her suspect classification, the modifying
ruling would trigger heightened scrutiny.250 Given the history of discriminatory statutes aimed at homosexuals and the statutes’ likewise discriminatory purposes, one might conclude that modifying a child custody order
based on homosexuality is discriminatory.251 The heightened or strict
scrutiny analyses’ burdens are difficult to overcome, therefore making the
discriminatory purpose less likely to prevail.252 However, while these
rights of parents deserve consideration following the use of heightened
scrutiny analyses, the interests of the parent must be balanced with the best
interests of the child.253
B. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN CONNECTION WITH
DAMRON
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron appears to have begun to
focus more on the best interests of the child tenet, as it applied the most
progressive approach—the nexus standard—to show that homosexuality
cannot be a reason to deny custody without proof of actual harm to the
child.254 Homosexuality is still a focus in Damron, based on the possibility
that a parent requesting modification could somehow show that the child is
246. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978).
247. Id. at 357 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
248. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581-85 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute was
unconstitutional because it criminalized sodomy, and opining that it targeted homosexuals).
249. Brief of Appellant, supra note 11, at 75.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the best interests of the child as set forth in
Damron).
254. Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d 871, 876.
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in danger.255 However, children are best served today in North Dakota
through the Damron standard.256
The legal analysis used in Damron is much more attuned to the child’s
best interests than the standards used in Jacobson and Schlotman, which
focused more on the homosexuality of the parent rather than the best
interests of the child.257 The North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron
explicitly and frequently discussed the best interests of the child.258
Moreover, the court focused on the recognition of “a doctrinal aversion to
changing the custody of a happy child who has been living with one
parent.”259 The court also expressed a need to maintain “stability and
continuity in the child’s life, without harm to the child.”260 The sentiments
declared by the Damron court repeatedly expressed a focus on the best
interests of the child.261
Following the Damron decision, North Dakota courts will likely focus
more on the best interests of the child tenet in future custody hearings,
when confronted with whether to award or deny custody or custody modification to a homosexual parent.262 Courts will look to the true interests of
the child rather than focusing on the private and personal actions of the
parents when no danger is presumable.263 The court’s decision in Damron
sets an example for future custody rulings regarding the homosexuality of a
custodial parent, because it focuses much more on what would best serve
the child.264
255. Id.
256. Compare Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality was not
grounds for modifying child custody because the father did not offer proof that the custodial
parent’s living environment was unsuitable for their children) with Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (finding that a homosexual parent engaged in immoral practices was
inconsistent with providing an environment suitable for a child, and failing to look at facts proving
that the heterosexual parent may indeed provide a better environment).
257. See Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (“[B]ecause of the mores of today’s society, because
[the mother] is engaged in a homosexual relationship in the home in which she resides with the
children . . . the best interests of the children will be better served by placing custody of the
children with [the father].”).
258. Damron, ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d at 874.
259. Id. ¶ 6.
260. Id. (internal citation omitted).
261. Id. ¶¶ 6-8, 670 N.W.2d at 874.
262. See id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (establishing a new standard in requiring more evidence
to prove that a homosexual parent’s living environment would endanger a child).
263. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that the private lives of
individuals must not be interfered with by state statutes); Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876
(holding that homosexuality was not grounds for modifying child custody and requiring more
proof of harm to a child).
264. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1981) (holding that homosexuality
could be grounds for modifying a previous custody order); but see Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at
876 (holding that homosexuality was not grounds for modifying a previous child custody ruling).
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V. OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER CHANGE
At one time, courts both nationwide and in North Dakota denied
custody to homosexual parents at the outset of a child custody or custody
modification proceeding.265 Now, actual proof of harm is required if the
noncustodial parent seeking modification argues that a child is harmed by a
parent’s homosexuality.266 Damron requires more concrete evidence of
detriment to a child in determining the child’s best interests, since the
overruling of Jacobson.267 The amount of evidence necessary to modify a
custody ruling favoring a gay or lesbian parent is yet to be determined.268
This question presented after Damron, regarding the amount and level
of evidence required to modify a custody ruling in favor of a child’s homosexual parent, predicts future changes in North Dakota child custody case
law.269 The North Dakota Supreme Court did not set a standard for the type
or amount of evidence required to modify such a ruling.270 It is similarly
not entirely clear what that evidence will mean for homosexual parents in
North Dakota in the future.271 Perhaps the topic of sexual orientation will
disappear from custody determinations altogether.272 Furthermore, perhaps
no focus will be placed on the harmful distinctions between heterosexual
and homosexual parents, thereby preventing potentially discriminatory
court opinions.273 These questions are discussed in Parts V.A and V.B.274

265. See, e.g., Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (modifying custody based on a mother’s homosexuality and fearing the children may be harmed).
266. See, e.g., Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 875-76 (requiring evidence that proves that a
child is harmed due to the environment in which the child resides).
267. Id.
268. See id. (holding that homosexuality cannot be the basis for custody modification without clear evidence that a child is harmed, but not stating what kind or how much evidence is
needed).
269. See discussion infra Part V.A (reviewing Damron and discussing the type and amount
of evidence that Damron requires of a parent seeking to modify a previous child custody ruling).
270. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that more evidence is required of a noncustodial heterosexual parent requesting child custody modification, but not elaborating on how
much evidence is required).
271. See discussion infra Part V.A (discussing the evidence that North Dakota courts will
require of parents attempting child custody modification).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See discussion infra Parts V.A-B (discussing a modified approach that would apply to
child custody and custody modification proceedings to eradicate courts’ determining homosexual
as a limiting factor in obtaining or maintaining custody).
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A. COMPARISON OF HETEROSEXUAL AND HOMOSEXUAL PARENTS:
EVIDENCE COURTS REQUIRE
Recently, the North Dakota Supreme Court asked that the heterosexual
parent seeking the modification of a custody ruling provide evidence that a
child’s well-being is in danger upon remaining with the child’s homosexual
parent.275
The heterosexual, noncustodial parent must “establish a
significant change in circumstances which adversely affects the child.” 276
Moreover, the noncustodial parent has “the burden to show [that] modification [is] necessary to serve the best interests of the children and to show the
children’s present environment may endanger their physical or emotional
health or impair their emotional development.”277 The noncustodial parent
must provide evidence adverse to the custodial parent, that the home
environment will otherwise harm the child.278 Perhaps significant to the
topic of child custody and custody modification, the court is silent as to
homosexuality in these particular rules.279 The court seems to suggest that
there would be no difference in the amount or type of evidence that a parent
would need to provide—regardless of his or her sexual orientation.280
However, while the court is silent on the topic of homosexuality in these
particular statements, homosexuality was still discussed in Damron.281
As Damron implies, a homosexual parent seeking the modification of a
child custody order, where a preliminary custody ruling favored a heterosexual parent, would not need to prove to the court that the heterosexuality
of the custodial parent would harm the child.282 To the contrary, the court
stated that a modification may take place if a heterosexual parent provides
enough evidence to show that the sexual orientation of the homosexual
parent will harm the child.283 The difference in what is asked of the noncustodial parent as to the modification of a previous custody ruling suggests

275. Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
276. Id. ¶ 7, 670 N.W.2d at 874.
277. Id. ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875.
278. See id. (stating that the noncustodial parent must provide “some evidence [that] the
custodial parent’s custodial environment may endanger the children”).
279. See id. ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (“[A] custodial parent’s homosexual household is not
grounds for modifying custody within two years of a prior custody order in the absence of
evidence that [the] environment endangers or potentially endangers the children’s physical or
emotional health or impairs their emotional development.”).
280. See id. ¶ 13 (explaining that although the heterosexual parent offered testimony challenging the morality of his wife’s homosexuality as a basis for parental unfitness, the testimony
was insufficient to show that her homosexual relationship was either actually or potentially
harming the children).
281. Id.
282. Id. ¶ 1, 670 N.W.2d at 873.
283. Id. ¶ 12, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
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that a greater burden is placed on the heterosexual parent to provide
additional evidence of actual or potential harm.284 However, this difference
also implies that unwarranted emphasis is still being placed upon the sexual
orientation of the custodial homosexual parent, while the privacy of the
heterosexual parent, especially with regard to his or her relationships, is
preserved.285
A court would not ask a homosexual parent to prove that the heterosexuality of the other parent was causing harm to the child, because the
morals of heterosexuality have not been stigmatized in the same way as
those of homosexuality.286 A court would also likely find an investigation
of the heterosexual parent’s sexual orientation to be unnecessary. 287 As
United States Supreme Court precedent has stressed, investigation into such
private actions would be an invasion of privacy.288 It is apparent, therefore,
that heterosexual and homosexual parents are treated very differently in
maintaining or modifying child custody.289
As previously stated, a court would not likely urge a parent to investigate the harmful effects that heterosexuality would have on a child.290
However, as to how great the noncustodial heterosexual parent’s burden
would be to justify modification of a prior custodial ruling favoring a gay or
lesbian parent is uncertain.291 The Damron court only states that “there
must be some evidence [that] the custodial parent’s custodial environment
may endanger the children.”292 “Some evidence” is clearly an ambiguous
measurement of the amount required to modify custody.293

284. See id. ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d at 874 (citing Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, ¶¶ 16, 18, 561
N.W.2d 612, at 616-17) (“[T]he burden on a noncustodial parent seeking a change of custody is
‘daunting’ and ‘arduous.’”).
285. See Huff, supra note 2, at 701 (noting that courts place much emphasis on the morality
of homosexuality when determining that the best interests of a child will be best served with the
heterosexual parent).
286. Id. at 702.
287. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“[T]he right to make certain
decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”).
288. Id.
289. See generally Damron, ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (finding that a heterosexual parent
seeking to modify a custody order that favors the homosexual parent must provide more evidence
when a parent is homosexual); see also Huff, supra note 2, at 695-96 (arguing that homosexual
and heterosexual parents are treated differently in custody cases).
290. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (stating that the heterosexual, noncustodial
parent must provide “actual evidence,” but not elaborating on the meaning of “actual evidence”).
291. Id.
292. Id. ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875 (citing In re Thompson, 2003 ND 61, ¶ 12, 659 N.W.2d
864, at 868) (emphasis added).
293. Id.
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The court did offer reference as to what evidence had been offered by
the noncustodial father in Damron, however.294 The father of the children
had offered that the children’s mother’s homosexuality and homosexual
relationship set the wrong moral character example for his children.295 The
court stated that the father, in asserting this, did not provide evidence that
the mother’s homosexuality or homosexual relationship was causing “actual
or potential harm to the children.”296
As applied, Damron requires more evidence in future child custody
cases where non-custodial parents wish to modify a custody ruling based on
the homosexuality of the custodial parent.297 The court’s silence, however—as to how much or what type of evidence must be presented to justify
modification of a previous custodial hearing favoring the homosexual
parent—could prove to be very beneficial for homosexual parents in North
Dakota.298 Heterosexual parents seeking modification due to the homosexuality of the custodial parent are burdened to provide evidence to satisfy an
ambiguous standard that will convince North Dakota courts that a child is
actually or potentially being harmed.299 The Damron court’s requirement
does not provide a clear definition of “actual or potential harm.”300
The Damron court’s requirement of “potential harm” is significant in
this regard.301 The children’s father in Damron argued that his ex-wife’s
relationship had the potential to set “the wrong moral character for [his]
children.”302 While “potential harm” may be viewed as a relatively easy
standard to satisfy, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument,
and required more evidence.303 The court’s rejection of the father’s
“potential harm” fails to aid the noncustodial parent attempting to modify

294. Id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text (explaining the ambiguities of
Damron’s language as to the amount and level of evidence necessary to modify custody and to
remove children from the custody of a homosexual parent).
299. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text (reviewing the language from Damron
requiring the moving parent to provide “actual or potential harm”).
300. Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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custody due to the homosexuality of the custodial parent.304 The court did
not further define how “potential harm” might be satisfied.305
As Damron shows, immorality as related to homosexuality and raising
children is no longer accepted as an argument in North Dakota child
custody hearings.306 As opposed to previous North Dakota child custody
cases, custody modification based on homosexuality alone will not occur.307
Much more evidence is required to show that the best interests of the child
are jeopardized.308 While a child’s best interests might more easily be
satisfied by North Dakota’s Damron standard, perhaps the existing standard
might benefit from further adaptations.309
B. PROPOSAL FOR THE ADOPTION OF MORE FAVORABLE LEGAL
STANDARDS IN NORTH DAKOTA
As discussed, courts have traditionally applied either the per se, middle
ground, or nexus standards to child custody cases involving homosexual
parents.310 Damron appears to have applied the nexus approach, as
homosexuality was not grounds to modify custody without evidence of
actual or potential harm to the child.311 While the nexus approach is likely
the most favorable standard applied to modern custodial rulings, it is also
true that it continues to factor in homosexuality, albeit in a much less
emphasized manner.312 Courts should not focus on homosexuality when
determining the best interests of the child.313 Placing emphasis on homosexuality allows a court to disservice a homosexual parent’s ability to raise
a child.314 Emphasizing homosexuality also discounts a child’s true best

304. See id. (showing that the father testified that the children’s mother’s homosexual
relationship was detrimental to the children’s wellbeing, but stating that this testimony was not
enough to satisfy even the requirement of showing potential harm).
305. See id. (providing that “potential harm” may be offered, but rejecting the father’s
argument, and leaving the question open as to when “potential harm” may be satisfied).
306. Id.
307. See id. ¶ 9, 670 N.W. at 875 (overruling Jacobson, which created a presumption that a
showing of homosexuality was alone enough to justify a custody modification).
308. Id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
309. See discussion infra Part V.B (discussing possible future adaptations of the Damron
standard).
310. See discussion supra Part III.B.1-3 (discussing the nexus, middle ground, and per se
approaches); Huff, supra note 2, at 699 (stating that courts apply either the per se, middle ground,
or nexus tests to child custody determinations involving homosexual parents).
311. Damron, ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875.
312. See generally Huff, supra note 2, at 695-96 (arguing that courts place too much
emphasis on homosexuality, but that the child’s best interests may be well served by living with
the homosexual parent).
313. Id. at 699.
314. Id.
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interests, because a homosexual parent may indeed provide a better
environment than a heterosexual parent.315
The best legal standard to apply to child custody matters is one that is
silent on the topic of sexual orientation, to ensure both the best interests of
the child and rights of the parents.316 The rights of gay or lesbian parents
would be recognized because their sexual orientation would not be
addressed, thus preserving their right to privacy.317 Courts should recognize that “[w]hether and whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy,
and whether and how to establish a family—these are among the most basic
of every individual’s liberty.”318 Parents’ privacy and right to raise
children, therefore, should not be intruded upon unless the child’s best
interests are harmed.319 In addition to preserving parents’ privacy, there
would be no difference as to the evidence that a homosexual or heterosexual
parent might provide to modify a custody ruling.320
The best interests of the child factors, upon which judiciaries so often
purport to center their custody rulings, would also be benefited if courts
adopted a standard ignoring the sexual orientation of the parents.321 Like
the North Dakota Supreme Court in Damron, future child custody and
custody modification determinations would be based solely on “maintaining
stability and continuity in the child’s life.”322 Future custody determinations using this modified standard would also spare “children the ‘painful,
disruptive, and destabilizing’ effects of repeat custody litigation” that arise
in modification proceedings.323
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s finding in Damron suggests that a
heterosexual noncustodial parent may still show that homosexuality has the
potential to, or actually will, adversely affect a child.324 However, the

315. Id.
316. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (regarding privacy as a
fundamental interest, thereby inferring that private homosexual conduct may not be treated
differently than heterosexual conduct); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health Mass., 798 N.E.2d 941,
956 (Mass. 2003) (opining that same-sex couples have the right to marry, thereby allowing them
the same benefits to child custody that heterosexual couples have).
317. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559 (finding that privacy is a fundamental interest).
318. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959.
319. Id.; Damron v. Damron, 2003 ND 166, ¶ 3, 670 N.W.2d 871, 873.
320. See discussion infra Part V.A (discussing the amount of evidence that a parent seeking
custody modification must offer); see generally Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (failing to
elaborate on whether a homosexual parent pursuing modification must show that heterosexuality
will endanger the child’s well-being).
321. Damron, ¶ 6, 670 N.W.2d at 874.
322. Id.
323. Id. (citing Quarne v. Quarne, 1999 ND 188, ¶ 9, 601 N.W.2d 256).
324. See id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W. 2d at 876 (requiring the moving party to present evidence of
actual or potential harm to the children).
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Damron ruling is based largely upon requiring that, regardless of the
custodial parent’s sexual orientation, the noncustodial parent show “some
evidence” of danger to the child’s well-being.325 Future courts should focus
on the Damron standard in this regard, while eliminating any discussion of
how homosexuality itself will endanger the children involved.326
VI. CONCLUSION
The notion that homosexual parenting may be harmful to children has
long been debated and may continue to be debated for years to come.327
Recent child custody decisions have perpetuated arguments surrounding
morality and professed differences between the parenting of homosexual
and heterosexual individuals.328 However, scholars and courts have also
noted that there is no difference between the parenting skills of homosexual
and heterosexual parents.329 The emphasis on homosexuality in child
custody determinations, therefore, has changed greatly in recent decades.330
Courts are moving away from an emphasis on homosexuality and more to
parents’ rights to bear and raise children, to protection of privacy, and to
true observance of the best interests of children.331
North Dakota courts have followed this pattern, largely focusing on the
best interests principle and ignoring arguments that homosexuality will

325. Id. ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875.
326. See id. ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality cannot be grounds to
modify custody); Huff, supra note 2, at 695 (stating that courts should not look to the
homosexuality of a parent in determining child custody matters, because homosexual parents
provide an adequate upbringing regardless of their sexuality). Both parents’ and children’s rights
will likely be best served in this capacity because the court does not place focus on the sexuality
of the parent, which only speculatively would have an effect on the child. See generally Huff,
supra note 2, at 695 (proposing that a fairer outcome would be reached if courts would cease their
focus on the homosexuality of parents in child custody matters).
327. See Huff, supra note 2, at 696 (“[A] homosexual parent is as able as a heterosexual
parent to raise a well-adjusted child” and that “courts should not find a distinction between
homosexual and heterosexual parenting”).
328. See Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (stating that social ideals of
homosexuality cannot be ignored when making a custody decision).
329. See Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality is not a reason to
modify custody where the children appear happy and healthy in their current environment); Huff,
supra note 2, passim.
330. See Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d at 82 (stating that homosexuality may be a significant factor
in denying custody); but see Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality
cannot be grounds for modifying child custody).
331. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (discussing the right to privacy);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding that the right to bear and raise children
is a fundamental right); Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (requiring more evidence for custody
modification to ensure the best interests of the child).
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endanger a child’s well-being or moral upbringing.332 The changing focus
of custody rulings and custody modifications will likely continue to affect
jurisdictions that have not adopted the contemporary nexus rule.333 These
changes may thereby prompt the adoption of a further-modified nexus
standard as homosexual parents continue to press courts to eliminate the
emphasis of sexual orientation.334
A change may be seen in future North Dakota cases, as well.335 The
Damron ruling has opened doors for future custody rulings.336 Although
homosexuality was considered as a factor in modifying custody in Damron,
provided enough evidence was shown to justify the modification, the North
Dakota Supreme Court’s decision did not place a clear minimum on the
amount of evidence that must be provided by the noncustodial parent.337
This ambiguity places a heavy burden on a heterosexual noncustodial
parent, and implies that a noncustodial parent will unlikely succeed in his or
her endeavors to remove children from the custody of a homosexual parent,
based on sexual orientation.338
United States Supreme Court precedent shows that ending discrimination based on sexual orientation has been an arduous endeavor.339 When
Supreme Court Justices agree with society’s notions and fears of homosexuality, and likewise enunciate these mores and values in Court decisions,
the task of alleviating the stigmatization of homosexual individuals
becomes even more daunting.340 Courts have steadily departed from
approving of discriminatory statutes and practices, however.341 This
conclusion is evidenced by North Dakota Supreme Court custody rulings
within the past twenty-five years.342 Courts that once focused on
332. See, e.g., Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (holding that homosexuality is not a per se
bar to custody, and stating that the best interests of the child should be the focus of the court in
child custody matters).
333. Gill, supra note 6, at 362.
334. Id.
335. Damron, ¶ 11, 670 N.W.2d at 875.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (denying
readmission of a former Boy Scouts member to the organization via the New Jersey public
accommodation statute, because the private organization, although alleging it followed a set of
mores and standards disallowing homosexual members, did not fall under the statute).
340. Id.
341. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (opining that the state
cannot interfere with the private acts of individuals); Dale, 530 U.S. at 678-79 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court should not allow an organization to discriminate against a
homosexual male); Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (not setting a clear standard for the amount
of evidence heterosexual noncustodial parents must bring to modify custody).
342. Damron, ¶ 13, 670 N.W.2d at 876.
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homosexuality to justify removing children from their parents now make
modification based solely on homosexuality nearly impossible.343 Changes
are necessary to further ensure that homosexuality is not considered in
custody rulings, thus compelling courts to determine only the best interests
of the child.344 Courts in North Dakota and nationwide are almost certainly
moving in this direction, and will adopt standards that mirror these
considerations in the very near future.345
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343. Id.
344. Gill, supra note 6, at 362.
345. See generally Damron, 670 N.W.2d at 876 (using a standard much closer to the nexus
standard, which focuses less on homosexuality as a factor determining custody); see also Huff,
supra note 2, at 695 (arguing that homosexuality should not be a factor considered in determining
custody, because courts should not recognize a difference in the parenting abilities of homosexual
and heterosexual parents).
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